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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE. OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through l 
its ENGINEERING COMMISSION, 
D. H. Whittenburg, Chairman, H. J.l 
Corleissen and Layton Maxfield, Mem-
bers of the ENGINEERING COM-
MISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
(Fred Tedesco) et al., and BURTON 
F. PEEK and CHARLES D. WI-
MAN, Trustees under the Will and of I 
the Estate of CHARLES H. DEERE, 
Deceased, j. 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8290 
RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Respondents respectfully request a rehearing of the 
above cause on the following ground: 
(1) The court erred in its decision that "The test is 
not what the lots will bring when and if 62 willing buyers 
come along, but what the tract as a unit, and as is, platted 
or not, and in whatever state of completion, will bring 
from a willing buyer of the whole tract." 
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If that statement was intended to mean what it seems 
to say, then the ruling is in contravention of Section 78-
34-10, Utah Code 1953; of Article I of Section 22, Con-
stitution of Utah, and of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States, in 
that said ruling would authorize the taking of respon-
dants' property without just compensation and without 
due process of law. 
BRIEF 
1. 
POINT 
A condemner is not, by r~on of his singleness, entitled 
to a discounted price. 
We are here concerned with Parcel 1 only, and of 
Parcell, only sub-parcels A and B. 
By this petition it is sought to clarify the court's 
statement quoted and here repeated as follows: 
"The test is not what the lots will bring when 
and if 62 willing buyers come along, but what the 
tract as a unit, and as is, platted or not, and in 
whatever state of completion, will bring from a 
willing buyer of the whole tract." 
If that statement was intended to mean literally what it 
would seem to say, then we respectfully submit that one 
will search in vain for authority to support it, either in 
the citations set forth in the court's opinion or anywhere 
else, so far as we are informed. It is out of step with the 
court's reasoning expressed in its opinion and the uni-
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versal rule, which quite obviously it is the court's inten-
tion to follow. 
vV e concur in the court's conclusion that the experts 
must take into consideration all costs reasonably to be 
anticipated as those to be incurred after July 12, 1951 
necessary to the marketing of these lots ; and like the 
opinion of an expert responsive to an hypothetical ques-
tion, the record must fully and accurately encompass the 
factual basis upon which the expert's opinion shall rest-
otherwise the opinion will be irrelevant and inadmissible 
and on motion should be stricken. 
The question is as to the fair market value on July 
12, 1951 of the property condemned-the whole tract of 
course, and in its then condition, but that does not imply 
that the State may conjure up a fictitious purchaser and 
discount the fair market value of the tract on July 12, 
1951, by whatever amount may be thought sufficient to 
assure this imaginary creature a profit sufficient to in-
terest him in doing the very thing these respondents were 
doing, i.e., selling the tract in lot units to purchasers, 
whatever their number, who might come to buy. 
The State might just as well attempt to defend its 
seizure of a part of the tract without paying for it, as to 
assume that, as to these respondents, the tract was of 
less than its market value because the State had made 
it impossible for respondents to continue to sell in 
lot units to those willing to buy. Two parties are neces-
sary to a sale and respondents were not discounting 
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the tract's market value to enable some one else to step 
in at a discounted figure and carry the project to the 
very conclusion to which the respondents were committed. 
What such an imaginary individual, pursuing the fiction, 
might be willing to pay for the tract whereby to usurp 
respondents' rightful function, by himself selling it in lot 
units to others, bears no relation whatever to the issue 
before the court, namely, what was the fair market value 
of the tract on July 12, 1951, viewed from "the most ad-
vantageous use in the future to which the land may be 
reasonably applied." 
It is respectfully submitted that a condemner may 
not so arbitrarily subject the owner to such fantastic pre-
sumptions. Respondents had no intention of liqui-
dating their enterprise, and the market value of their 
property cannot be measured on the basis of a forced 
sale in liquidation. Respondents had not labored 
and planned over the years merely to bring their project 
to the final stage of fruition, then to unload and volun-
tarily surrender their profit by selling for a price dis-
counted sufficiently to enable another to reap their har-
vest. The value of an owner's right to sell his tract in 
such manner as to realize from such sale the greatest 
possible return, whatever number the purchasers, is a 
very substantial part of the fair market value of the 
tract, of which the owner may not be deprived. What 
is sought here is the damage sustained by respondents be-
cause deprived of their right. Any contrary conclusion 
belies the very authorities upon which the court relies, 
and accordingly we cannot think the court intended by 
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its language to announce any other decision than that so 
expressed in the universal rule. But such is the State's 
theory, and .it is the very antithesis of just or fair com-
pensation. It is a denial of compensation, it precludes 
a recovery of fair market value because it forbids con-
sideration of the principle element of fair market value, 
i.e., "the most advantageous use to which the property 
may reasonably be applied," and eliminates the very 
use to which the respondent owners were applying the 
land and to which it was the purpose of respondents to 
continue to apply it. 
A condemner is not, by reason of his singleness, 
entitled to a discounted price. 
CONCLUSION 
Whatever may be the correct interpretation of the 
court's statement, not only should the court below be 
advised in language susceptible to no other interpreta-
tion, but the parties also should be made aware in no 
uncertain language, of just what issue they will be re-
quired to meet in the further progress of this litigation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KEITH E. TAYLOR, 
Of Counsel. 
C. C. PARSONS, 
A. D. MOFFAT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents. 
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